After it extended emergency rule for six more months in July, Myanmar’s regime reshuffled its cabinet and changed its “five-point roadmap” and “12 objectives” which it adopted after the 2021 coup.
The changes saw the junta’s proposed “election” become the top priority. It was previously the fifth point in the roadmap.
The second is about foreign policy. The country officially had an “independent and non-aligned” foreign policy since independence in 1948 but this has now been ditched.
The regime has removed “to ensure economic prosperity for the entire nation by establishing a stable market economy and inviting foreign investments” from its original manifesto. The three policy changes are related.
The Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League government after independence participated in the non-aligned Bandung Conference.
It was a meeting of Asian and African states, most of which were newly independent, in 1955 amid the Cold War tensions. The states adopted “independent” foreign policies, free from interference from Moscow and Washington.
The regime has ditched this policy to boost its Russian ties.
Russia and China
In a significant departure from tradition, Myanmar’s junta, after the 2021 coup, approached Russia over China, the traditional ally of previous generals. The regime expresses total support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and everything else Moscow has done. Regime chief Min Aung Hlaing has hailed Putin as a “world leader”.
But the regime has been forced to return to China’s embrace, with Beijing increasingly powerful on the global stage.
Despite some initial hesitation after the coup, China finally moved to reengage late last year with Myanmar, where it has considerable interests.
Since then, senior Chinese representatives, including the special envoy on Myanmar and Communist Party officials, diplomats and military officers, have visited Naypyitaw.
While ASEAN is pushing the junta to engage with all parties under its five-point peace plan, Chinese foreign minister Qin Gang told generals in Naypyitaw in May that he “supports Myanmar in advancing its political transition process and backs parties in the country to properly address differences and seek national reconciliation under the constitutional and legal framework”.
Only China will know what it means by “political transition under the military-drafted 2008 Constitution” as opposed to ASEAN’s call for dialogue with all parties. The probable explanation, however, is that China has signaled its support for the junta’s proposed general election, which many foreign governments say will be a sham.
Election priority
Some two months after China made this suggestion, the regime changed policy as it extended emergency rule for six months. And an election has become its priority.
The transition under the 2008 Constitution is not a new idea. Myanmar had a transition period after 2011. By saying political transition under the legal framework, China apparently refers to a repeat of Myanmar’s transition from military rule to a quasi-democracy in 2011, with ex-generals forming a government.
Ex-general Thein Sein’s administration started political reforms by offering peace talks to ethnic armed organizations, releasing political prisoners, allowing the National League for Democracy (NLD) to take part in elections and granting press freedom.
His political and economic reforms won international recognition, convincing Western democracies to lift sanctions and attract foreign investment. Politics was no longer taboo and the administration won trust over time.
The peak came when Thein Sein transferred power to the NLD after the 2015 general election. The power transfer convinced people and the international community that Myanmar’s political transition was irreversible.
People started to enjoy the fruits of political and economic liberty and have greater hope for the future.
People felt free for the first time after nearly five decades of suffocation under military rule since 1962.
The changes were not caused by voting but because of the political reforms. The 2015 election was only part of the process.
Coup ruined reforms
Ten years of reforms came to an end on February 1, 2021. Younger people who grew up free from military rule have seen all the progress ruined.
Thousands of politicians and activists have been put behind bars. The free press was crushed. Fresh international sanctions came and foreign investment evaporated. The kyat slumped and food, fuel, cooking oil and medicine prices shot up. While military rule has impoverished many families, some amassed wealth, working in tandem with the regime.
The junta’s brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters after the coup sparked an armed revolt, which spread across the country.
The regime, in response, has burned down more than 70,000 buildings including religious buildings, across the country. It has carried out massacres, countless war crimes and indiscriminate air and shelling attacks.
China’s push for transition
China’s suggestion of transition under the constitutional framework means holding an election and transferring power to the winner, even if it is the military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party.
This is why Chinese ambassador Chen Hai regularly meets the chair of the junta-appointed Union Election Commission. China also hosted the commission this year.
China seems to think it is safer to engage with an elected government rather than a regime even if the voting is a sham and the same people retain power.
A reason why the regime has prioritized holding an election after admitting it lacks control to organize voting is that it cannot say no to China.
However, an election without any political reform is meaningless and will solve no problems.
The junta’s future
The regime has abandoned a neutral foreign policy as it seeks support from China and Russia. It has rejected dialogue and is promising a general election.
One of the regime’s objectives was “to build a union based on democracy and federalism by applying a true and disciplined multi-party democratic system with full justice”. But it has now removed “full justice” from that objective.
The regime does not even bother to make empty promises of a free and fair election.
The regime has also removed “market economy” from its economic policies as creates an increasingly centralized economy.
The changes appear to be attempts to win approval from China and Russia.
It is not aware of or ignores the fact that doing so will only make it more difficult to retain power, intensify the many armed conflicts and worsen the economic crisis in Myanmar.
Banyar Aung is a researcher on politics and ethnic affairs.
